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Air Law-
FEDERAL COURT IMPLIES A REMEDY FOR VIOLATION
OF ANTI-DISCRIMINATION PROVISION OF THE
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
Plaintiffs, Negro passengers on defendant airline with through reserva-
tions from San Francisco to Sydney, Australia, were denied permission to
travel on from Honolulu on the same plane. Plaintiffs brought suit for
damages in a federal district court alleging that the airline's refusal to carry
them was a malicious and wilful violation of the Civil Aeronautics Act,
which outlaws all discriminations by air carriers.' The act provides for
criminal penalties 2 and for action by the Civil Aeronautics Board to
prevent violation,3 but no provision is made for recovery of damages by an
individual injured by practices in violation of the act.4 The district court
refused to imply a civil remedy from the regulatory provisions since the
airline had a common-law duty to transport anyone upon request, and
the plaintiffs, would, therefore, be able to recover damages in a state court
for breach of this duty.5 The court of appeals reversed, holding that a
remedy should be implied because the anti-discriminatory provision of the
statute, which was designed to protect a specified class of which plaintiffs
were members, created a "new federal right." Fitzgerald v. Pan American
World Airways, Inc., 229 F.2d 499 (2d Cir. 1956).
Although the federal courts frequently have been requested to imply
a private remedy for violation of a regulatory act,6 the decisions have not
been uniform-even in interpretations of the same statute.7 In the absence
of authoritative evidence of congressional intent, a number of considerations
1. 52 STAT. 993 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 484(b) (1952). The federal district court
has jurisdiction of the action because it arises under a law of the United States.
Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1952).
2. 52 STAT. 1015 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§ 621-22 (1952).
3. 52 STAT. 1018 (1938), 49 U.S.C. § 642(d) (1952).
4. The act, however, does preserve common-law remedies. 52 STAT. 1027
(1938), 49 U.S.C. § 676 (1952).
5. Fitzgerald v. Pan American World Airways, Inc., 132 F. Supp. 798 (S.D.N.Y.
1955).
6. See Note, Federal Jurisdiction in Suits for Damages Under Statutes Not
Affording Such Remedy, 48 CoLum. L. REv. 1090 (1948).
7. Compare Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953), with Beury v.
Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), aff'd on other grounds, 222 F.2d 464
(4th Cir. 1955); compare Goldstein v. Groesbeck, 142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944), with Downing v. Howard, 68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del. 1946),
aff'd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1947). Provisions of the Civil Aero-
nautics Act dealing with other topics have been construed with conflicting results.
Compare Laughlin v. Riddle Aviation Co., 205 F.2d 948 (5th Cir. 1953), with Slick
Airways, Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc., 107 F. Supp. 199, 212 (D.N.J. 1951)
(dictum).
(864)
RECENT CASES
seem to have guided the courts. Several have refused relief because a
common-law remedy was available to the plaintiff,' but this approach has
often been rejected.9 The need for an implied remedy has been recognized
where common-law relief is either unavailable 'o or subject to obstacles
which would defeat the aims of the legislation." On the other hand, a
remedy has not been implied where it would invite a flood of litigation in
the federal courts respecting interests which can be as adequately protected
in state courts. 12 But other considerations have been equally important in
determining whether or not to imply a cause of action. A federal remedy
has been implied where the statute creates a system of federal control for a
broad area, primarily because leaving the aggrieved party to seek redress
under state common law would result in a lack of uniformity in decisions
which in turn would undermine the purposes of the statute.13 With an
implied remedy unanimity of treatment is virtually assured, for the federal
courts would be interpreting a single statute, and the federal remedy will
probably be preferred over the state's. Federal courts also have sought to
determine whether the parties seeking relief were members of a fairly
restricted class for whose protection the statute was enacted. 14 Nonetheless,
a remedy has not been implied where damage recovery would broaden the
impact of the provision inconsistently with the policy upon which the
statute is founded. 15 Furthermore, when the administrative agency has
sufficient sanctions to insure compliance with the provisions of the act
in question, a private cause of action has been refused.'
The instant court cited some of these factors to support its result, and
it is true that there is a good argument in favor of the decision. Certainly
8. Beury v. Beury, 127 F. Supp. 786 (S.D.W. Va. 1954), aff'd on other gronmds,
222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955), 103 U. PA. L. Rav. 1098; Downing v. Howard,
68 F. Supp. 6 (D. Del. 1946), aff'd on other grounds, 162 F.2d 654 (3d Cir. 1947);
cf. Schuman v. Little Bay Constr. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 903 (S.D.N.Y. 1953); Bell v.
Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947).
9. See Beury v. Beury, 222 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1955) (dictum) ; Fratt v. Robinson,
203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Baird v. Franklin, 141 F.2d 238, 245 (2d Cir.) (dis-
senting opinion), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944).
10. See Tunstall v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, 323 U.S. 210, 213 (1944);
Reitmeister v. Reitmeister, 162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Kardon v. National Gypsum
Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
11. See Fratt v. Robinson, 203 F.2d 627 (9th Cir. 1953) ; Goldstein v. Groesbeck,
142 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 737 (1944) ; Note, New Civil Liabilities
Under Securities and Exchange Act Rules, 14 U. CGi. L. REv. 471, 473 (1947).
12. See Gilvary v. Cuyahoga Valley Ry., 292 U.S. 57 (1934) ; Moore v. Chesapeake
& 0. Ry., 291 U.S. 205 (1933); Jacobson v. New York, N.H. & H.R.R., 206 F.2d
153 (1st Cir. 1953), aff'd per curiam, 347 U.S. 909 (1954).
13. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 263 (1951) (dissenting opinion), 65 HARv. L. REv. 700 (1952).
14. 2 RESTATEMENT, TORTS § 286 (1934). See also Reitmeister v. Reitmeister,
162 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1947); Note, The Use of Criminal Statutes in the Creation
of New Torts, 48 CoLum. L. Rxv. 456 (1948).
15. See Vance v. Safeways Stores, Inc., 137 F. Supp. 841 (D.N. Mex. 1956);
REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL CoMMITEE To STUDY THE" ANTI-
TRUST LAWS 200 (1955).
16. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S. 246,
254 (1951) ; id. at 258 (dissenting opinion) ; Consolidated Freightways, Inc. v. United
Truck Lines, Inc., 216 F.2d 543 (1954), 68 HAuv. L. Rav. 1272 (1955).
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the "protected class" rationale is applicable under the statutory provision
involved. Secondly, there seems to be a serious question of the adequacy
of common-law relief for unjust discrimination by a carrier.17 Procedurally,
it would seem important to have federal courts insure the fair administra-
tion of justice where pressures in state courts might prevent enforcement
of a common-law right.' 8 Diversity of citizenship,19 it is true, would au-
thorize the plaintiff to seek his remedy in a federal court and thus, to
,some extent, would eliminate the problem of prejudicial treatment of
minority groups in state proceedings. But federal diversity jurisdiction
requires the federal court to apply state common-law or statutory stand-
ards of recovery.2° Despite the common-law duty to carry, state law could
probably deny private recovery for segregation by a carrier not involving
a refusal of transportation, and such a rule would not violate constitutional
prohibitions. 2 ' The desire for uniformity also seems to weigh in favor of
implying a federal remedy. Leaving an individual to a remedy based on
17. Any dependence upon the efficacy of a common-law remedy may be unwar-
ranted. Although there is general agreement among text-writers that a public carrier
has such an absolute duty (PRossER, ToRTs 480 (2d ed. 1955); 1 WYMAN, PUBLIC
SER ICE Coam'oRATioNs § 335 (1911)), it has been recognized that carriers may refuse
transportation where all facilities have been reserved (2 HuTCaNsoN, CARRIERS
§ 963 (3d ed. 1906)) or where the request for transportation is made merely as a
foundation for an action alleging the refusal (see Southern Ry. v. Barlow, 104 Ga.
213, 30 S.E. 732 (1898); 1 WYMAN, PUBLIC SERVICE CORoRATIONs § 347 (1911)).
Furthermore, passengers must submit to reasonable rules of carriers for their comfort
and convenience. Brumfield v. Consolidated Coach Corp., 240 Ky. 1, 40 S.W.2d
976 (1935). Finally, it is doubtful that there is any common-law proscription against
the segregation of passengers by common carriers. Cf. Instant case at 502; Quindry,
Airline Passenger Discrimination,, 3 J. Am L. & CoM. 479, 504-14 (1932). See
note 21 infra. The state civil rights acts do not afford much better security for
injured parties. See KoNviTz, THE CONSTITUTION AND CIVI. RIGxTS 115-23 (1946).
18. Cf. 99 U. PA. L. REv. 543, 545 (1951).
19. Federal district courts have jurisdiction when the matter in controversy exceeds
$3000 and is between citizens of different states. Judicial Code, 28 U.S.C. § 1331
(1952). The amount in controversy requirement would normally be no obstacle in a
federal court since the injured party would probably claim punitive damages. Of
thirty-three of the largest passenger air carriers, thirteen are incorporated in Dela-
ware; nine are incorporated in "southern" states. See MOODY, TRANSPORTATION
MANUAL 1337-75 (1955). Of the sixteen jurisdictions in which these airlines are
incorporated, eleven, including Delaware, have no civil rights act which would make
segregation actionable. See AMERICAN JEWisH CONGRESS, Czcic LIST 0F STATE
ANTI-DIsCRIMINATION AND ANTI-BIAs LAWS (1953). Nevertheless, the great
majority of injured parties would be able to bring suit, in a federal court, and most
of those who must sue in state courts, as the plaintiffs in the instant case, will not
face strict interpretation of the carrier's common-law duty.
20. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
21. It is doubtful that the common-law duty to carry will justify awarding
damages for segregation. See instant case at 502; KoNviTz, op. cit. supra note 17,
at 121. Since the segregation is enforced by carrier practice rather than by state
legislation, the fourteenth amendment would not be violated; nor is it likely to be
held that a state court's refusal to give damages is state action within the meaning
of the fourteenth amendment. See Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc.,
245 Iowa 147, 60 N.W.2d 110 (1953), aff'd by an equally divided Court, 348 U.S.
880 (1954), judgment vacated on rehearing, 349 U.S. 70 (1955). If the United
States Supreme Court were to interpret the activities of a carrier with a state-
approved monopolistic position as state action (cf. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. "01
(1946)), there would be little need for an implied remedy since the federal civil
rights act would afford relief. See Civil Rights Act, Rav. STAT. 1979 (1875), 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 (1952).
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state law alone would prevent uniform treatment of a problem which affects
all of the jurisdictions in which air carriers maintain regular service. The
fact that a party is suing in one state rather than another could well change
either his ability to maintain a suit or the measure of damages for his in-
juries.22 An implied remedy, on the other hand, would allow federal courts
to supervise a system for preventing discrimination without any adherence
to state doctrines. Furthermore, it would make the law consistent through-
out the various parts of the transportation industry. Although the anti-
discrimination provisions of the Interstate Commerce Act 2 and the Motor
Carrier Act 24 are substantially identical to the provision in the Civil
Aeronautics Act, only the first specifically allows civil remedies. 25 Yet on
various pretexts, in cases arising under the Motor Carrier Act, federal
courts have allowed recovery for racial discriminations on interstate pas-
senger busses,26 and recent decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion indicate that segregation is one activity which will be deemed unjust
racial discrimination,2 and which will justify the award of damages. With
the addition of an implied remedy here, the federal courts, coordinating
civil actions with regulation by the agency,28 would be able to prevent dis-
criminations by all interstate carriers.
However, other considerations weighed in the balance would militate
against allowing private suits in this type of case. The sought-after relief
probably should be denied if the Civil Aeronautics Board has sufficient sanc-
tions to compel compliance with the statute. Some cases which have
denied a remedy on the basis of adequate agency enforcement have pointed
to the fact that monetary loss to the plaintiff was doubtful.2 9 Where this
is true the additional deterrent effect of a civil suit is negligible and there-
fore adds little or nothing to the enforcement of statutory standards. Com-
plete refusal to carry, based on discrimination, could lead to substantial
out-of-pocket loss. But because this violates a recognized common-law
right, federal courts with diversity jurisdiction will provide an adequate
remedy on the basis of state substantive law. Therefore, an implied remedy
is needed only to recompense travelers who have been segregated while
22. Compare Townsend v. Texas & N. 0. Ry., 40 Tex. Civ. App. 71, 88 S.W.
302 (1905), with Kibler v. Southern Ry., 64 S.C. 242, 41 S.E. 977 (1902). Compare
Schwartzman v. United Airlines Trans. Corp., 6 F.R.D. 517 (D. Neb. 1947), with
Holton v. Boston Elevated Ry., 303 Mass. 242, 245, 21 N.E.2d 251, 253 (1939)
(dictum).
23. 24 STAT. 380 (1887), as amended 49 U.S.C. § 3(1) (1952).
24. 49 STAT. 558 (1935), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 316(d) (1952).
25. 24 STAT. 382 (1887), as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 8 (1952), Solomon v. Penn-
sylvania R.R., 96 F. Supp. 709 (SD.N.Y. 1951) (semble).
26. See Carolina Coach Co. v. Williams, 207 F.2d 409 (4th Cir. 1953); Lyons v.
'Illinois Greyhound Lines, Inc., 192 F.2d 533 (7th Cir. 1951); Whiteside v. Southern
Bus Lines, 177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949).
27. National Ass'n for Advancement of Colored People v. St. Louis-S.F. Ry., 24
U.S.L. Wwc 2235 (ICC, Nov. 7, 1955); Keys v. Carolina Coach Co., 24 U.S.L.
WEEK 2234 (ICC, Nov. 7, 1955).
28. Cf. Note, 14 U. CHr. L. REv. 471, 477-78 (1947).
29. See Montana-Dakota Util. Co. v. Northwestern Pub. Serv. Co., 341 U.S.
246, 254 (1951).
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being transported. Such segregation by a carrier seldom, if ever, causes
monetary loss. Therefore, lack of substantial injury leads to the conclu-
sion that an implied private federal remedy for violations of this provi-
sion of the Civil Aeronautics Act does not significantly aid in the fulfillment
of the legislature's purpose and is unnecessary. Accepting this conclusion,
the federal courts would be in the anomalous position of affording a remedy
to those who are segregated, or otherwise prejudicially treated, in inter-
state train or bus trips, but not to those similarly injured in interstate air
travel. However, in the absence of a more pressing need for an implied
remedy, the court should defer to congressional action for elimination of
the anomaly or clarification of the basis for refusing a remedy.
Criminal Procedure-
FEDERAL AGENT ENJOINED BY FEDERAL COURT FROM
TESTIFYING IN STATE COURT AS TO ILLEGALLY
OBTAINED EVIDENCE
Petitioner was indicted in a federal district court upon evidence ob-
tained by a federal agent through the use of an invalid federal search
warrant.' The district court granted petitioner's motion to suppress the
evidence, whereupon the indictment was dismissed on the Government's
motion. Thereafter, the same federal agent filed a complaint with a state
judge and caused petitioner to be arrested for violation of a state statute.
Alleging that the evidence which had been suppressed in the federal court
formed the basis of the state charge, petitioner requested the federal district
court to enjoin the federal agent from transferring the seized evidence to
state authorities and from testifying with respect thereto in the state
courts. The district court denied the motion, and the court of appeals
affirmed.2 On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
federal rule prohibiting admission of evidence obtained by illegal search
and seizure 3 prescribes a standard for law enforcement by federal agents,
the policy of which is defeated if the federal agent can use the fruits of his
unlawful act either in federal or state court proceedings, and which is
subject to enforcement by the federal courts in their supervisory power
over federal law enforcement agencies. Rea v. United States, 350 U. S. 214
(1956).
Evidence obtained by federal agents through illegal search and seizure
is excluded from the federal courts, 4 not because admission violates the
1. Petitioner alleged that the warrant was improperly issued in that (a) the war-
rant was insufficient on its face, (b) no probable cause existed, and (c) the affidavit
was based on unsworn statements. Instant case at 214-15.
2. 218 F.2d 237 (10th Cir. 1954). The district court's opinion is unreported.
3. FED. R. CRIM. P. 41(e).
4. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616 (1886).
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Constitution but rather as a judicial policy whose purpose is the deterrence
of federal agents from unconstitutional invasions of personal libertyY
Although the due process clause prohibits unreasonable search and seizure
by state officers, the fourteenth amendment does not require state courts
to exclude evidence so obtained as a method. of enforcing the constitutional
sanction.6 While an increasing number of states follow the federal ex-
clusionary practice, 7 the majority still retain the common-law rule ignor-
ing the means of evidential acquisition,8 and the federal courts will refrain
from interfering with state criminal proceedings by refusing to enjoin
state courts from receiving evidence obtained by state officers in violation
of constitutional safeguards.0 Among those states which have adopted the
exclusionary rule, there exists a split on admission of evidence secured by
federal agents through illegal search and seizure: a few admit such evidence
by treating federal agents as strangers in the state court, analogizing to
the admission in federal courts of evidence seized illegally by state officers; 10
most exclude it on the ground that the exclusionary policy would be frus-
trated unless state citizens are given the same protection from federal
agents as from state agents. 1 The Supreme Court has never decided the
constitutionality of admitting such evidence in the state courts,' 2 and ex-
5. See United States v. Pugliese, 153 F2d 497 (2d Cir. 1945); Nueslein v. Dis-
trict of Columbia, 115 F2d 690 (D.C. Cir. 1940); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25,
41-46 (1949) (dissent). For a discussion of other rationales for exclusion and of
the efficacy of exclusion as an enforcement device, see Note, Judicial Control of
Illegal Search, 58 YALE L.J. 144 (1948).
6. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), 38 CALIF. L. Rav. 498 (1950), 50
COLum. L. REv. 364 (1950). However, where state officers obtain evidence by illegal
means which "shock the conscience," as by physical coercion, due process may compel
the exclusion of such evidence. Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952); see
Allen, Due Process and State Criminal Procedures: Another Look, 48 Nw. U.L. Rv.
16 (1953).
7. Since the Wolf decision, two states which had admitted illegally obtained
evidence have excluded such by statute, N.C. Gar. STAT. § 15-27 (1953); Tax. CODE
CRim. PROC. ANN. art. 727a (Supp. 1955), as has the previously uncommitted juris-
diction, R.I. AcTs & REsoLvEs c. 3590, § 16 (1955), and two states have judicially
reversed admissibility rules, People v. Cahan, 282 P.2d 905 (Cal. 1955) ; Rickards v.
State, 45 Del. 573, 77 A.2d 199 (1950).
8. See Appendix to Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 33-39 (1949). The common-
law rule is based on the probative value of the evidence irrespective of its means of
acquisition. See State v. Reynolds, 101 Conn. 224, 125 Atl. 636 (1924); People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926); 8 WGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§ 2183-84 (3d
ed. 1940).
9. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
10. E.g., State v. Gardner, 77 Mont. 8, 249 Pac. 574 (1926); see People v.
Touhy, 361 Ill. 332, 197 N.E. 849 (1935) (exclusion rule not applicable to evidence
seized by agents of another state). States which follow the common-law rule gen-
erally admit federally-seized evidence. See, e.g., Terrano v. State, 59 Nev. 247,
91 P.2d 67 (1939); Commonwealth v. Colpo, 98 Pa. Super. 460, cert. denied, 282
U.S. 863 (1930).
11. E.g., State v. Arregui, 44 Idaho 43, 254 Pac. 788 (1927) ; Walters v. Com-
monwealth, 199 Ky. 182, 250 S.W. 839 (1923); Little v. State, 171 Miss. 818, 159
So. 103 (1935); State v. Rebasti, 306 Mo. 336, 267 S.W. 858 (1924); State v,
Hiteshew, 42 Wyo. 147, 292 Pac. 2 (1930).
12. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 28 (1949); McNabb v. United States,
318 U.S. 332, 345 (1943).
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pressly disclaims doing so now.13 Instead, the Court in the Rea case
uses its "supervisory power" over federal agents to enjoin a federal agent
from testifying in the state court where the evidence has already been
suppressed under the exclusionary rule in a federal court.
Although the Government conceded the Court's power to grant relief,
14
it is not clear from what source that power is derived.15 The Court referred
to its supervisory power to enforce the "federal rules governing searches
and seizures," "I but it seems clear that rule 41(e) of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure does not require or authorize suppression in the
instant case, since the scope of the rules is limited to proceedings in the
federal courts and before United States commissioners. 17 Nor does the
Court's power over "property" seized as contraband authorize suppression
of testimony.' 8  Whatever the source of the Court's power, its exercise for
13. Instant case at 216.
14. Brief for Appellee, pp. 20-21, Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956).
15. Justice Harlan's dissent also conceded the Court's power to enjoin the agent,
without citing any authority. Instant case at 219. Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678
(1946) (action for damages from unconstitutional acts of F.B.I. agents), cited in
the Government's brief as supporting the Court's power, Brief for Appellee, p. 21,
Rea v. United States, 350 U.S. 214 (1956), held only that the federal courts have
jurisdiction to hear actions premised on violations of constitutional rights, as suits
arising under the Constitution, but did not decide that the Court. had authority to
grant relief. On remand, the suit was dismissed for failure to state a claim on which
relief could be.granted. Bell v. Hood, 71 F. Supp. 813 (S.D. Cal. 1947). Insofar
as Bell v. Hood draws a distinction between jurisdiction and power to grant a
remedy, it provides no support for the Court's power in the instant case. In
Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157 (1943) (injunction against enforcement
of unconstitutional ordinance denied on merits), also cited by the Government, the
power to grant relief was conferred by the Civil Rights Act, as it was in Stefanelli v.
Minard, 342 U.S. 117 (1951) (injunction against admission in state court of state-
seized evidence denied on merits). Since the Civil Rights Act applies only to actions
under color of state law, 18 U.S.C. §242 (1952), or to rights protected by the Con-
stitution against infringement by private persons, 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1952), United
States v. Williams, 341 U.S. 70 (1951), and since the fourth amendment protects
only against acts of federal officers, Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908),
the Court derives no power from the Civil Rights Act in the instant case. Further-
more, while the Court has frequently enjoined impending violations of the Constitution
by federal officers, e.g., Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605 (1912), there is here
no such violation impending, Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), unless the par-
ticipation of a federal officer as distinguished from state officers in Wolf is sufficient
to invoke the fourth amendment. It may also be arguable that the fourteenth amend-
ment is violated when a federal officer testifies to illegally seized evidence in a state
court. This seems a specious distinction of the Wolf case.
16. Instant case at 217.
17. FED. R. CRnt. P. 1; see 18 U.S.C. §§ 3771-72 (1952); Schwartz v. Texas,
344 U.S. 199 (1952); cf. Adams v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 179 (1954).
18. 28 U.S.C. § 2463 (1952) provides: "All property taken or detained under
any revenue law of the United States shall not be repleviable, but shall be deemed
to be in the custody of the law and subject only to the orders and decrees of the
courts of the United States having jurisdiction thereof." While this provision may
provide authority for the Court's control of the physical evidence, even though it is
arguable that the purpose of the statute is only to withhold the contraband from
the defendant, the power so conferred is clearly limited to control of the "property"
seized and does not extend to testimony. Since the Court, in referring to the
statute, instant case at 215, drew no distinction between the property and the testi-
mony, it seems unlikely that the Court intended to suggest the statute as a source
of its power. In the case of non-contraband, the evidence could be suppressed and
the property returned on motion in the district court under FED. R. CM. P. 41(e),
thereby making it equally unavailable to the state. The state could not intervene
to prevent a return to the defendant. See Covell v. Heyman, 111 U.S. 176 (1884).
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granting injunctive relief is determined by considerations of policy.', Since
the federal exclusionary, rule can have only limited effect as a deterrent on
unconstitutional conduct by federal officers so long as they remain free to
utilize illegally obtained evidence in state courts, the impulsion to close this
loophole in the rule is logically a strong one and, in the absence of counter-
vailing policies, would appear sufficient.
Accommodation of the Rea decision with Wolf v. Colorado 2o and
Stefanwlli v. Minard 21 is not difficult superficially. It is the conduct of
federal agents that the federal exclusionary rule is designed to control, not
the sanctity of the federal courts, as seen by the admission in federal courts
of evidence obtained illegally by independent action of state officers.2 Since
neither Wolf nor Stefanelli involved federal agents, the federal rule could
provide no basis for exclusion of the evidence in either of those cases.
The Court was thus compelled to decide Wolf on more restrictive con-
stitutional grounds, while it remained free to implement its exclusionary
policy in the instant case. Similarly, in Stefanelli an injunction was sought
directly against the state court, thereby raising a much more delicate prob-
lem of federal-state relations than is present in Rea, where the decree runs
only against the federal agent.2 However, there are matters which can-
not be reconciled so easily. The finding of imminent danger of irreparable
harm, which is implicit in the granting of an equitable injunction, con-
flicts with language in Stefanelli to the effect that use of such evidence does
not warrant such a finding.24 This language in the Stefanelli opinion is
clearly related to the fact that a conviction based upon such evidence would
not be unconstitutional under the Wolf doctrine, and the Court in the
instant case does not purport to be modifying Wolf. 25 On a more practical
level, there is a serious problem in federal-state relations born of this
19. Cf. Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 120 (1951).
20. 338 U.S. 25 (1949).
21. 342 U.S. 117 (1951).
22. E.g., Lotto v. United States, 157 F.2d 623 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Butler v. United
States, 153 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1946); Taylor v. Hudspeth, 113 F.2d 825 (10th
Cir. 1940); see Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914). While the
language of FED. R. Cam. P. 41(e) indicates no distinction between state-seized
and federally-seized evidence, the rule is considered as codifying existing law.
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON RULES OF CRIMINAL PRocuDUR, NoTEs 32 (1945).
23. Cf. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (state attorney general enjoined
from prosecuting defendant under unconstitutional state statute).
24. A mere impending state conviction does not constitute irreparable harm.
Stefanelli v. Minard, 342 U.S. 117, 122 (1951) (alternative holding) ; cf. Douglas
v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 163 (1943).
25. Of the present Court only Justice Douglas is on record for excluding such
evidence on constitutional grounds. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 149-52
(1954) (dissenting opinion). Justice Clark, however, has favored application of the
exclusionary rule to the states. Id. at 138 (concurring opinion). Justice Frank-
furter's majority opinion in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), and Justice
Black's concurring opinion therein place their views contra to that of Justice
Douglas. Justices Reed, Minton, and Burton were with the majority in Wolf and
concurred with Justice Harlan's dissent in the instant case. Chief Justice Warren's
support of the majority in the instant case provides ground for speculation as to his
position on the constitutional issue. It might be inferred from this alignment that
the Court employed the federal rule "standard" rationale in the instant case because
the chances of reaching an equivalent result on constitutional grounds were much
less likely.
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decision. The situation is such that in the future there is likely to be a race
between the federal injunction process to stop use of illegally obtained
evidence and state prosecutions based upon that evidence, .since use of such
evidence does not vitiate the result once admitted. To determine the result
in each case by the outcome of such a race will be not only capricious
but inevitably injurious to the relationship of the federal and state gov-
ernments. On the other hand, if the instant decision portends a ruling
that henceforth a state conviction founded on federally-seized evidence is
to be overturned, injunctive relief seems unnecessary as well as premature.26
It thus appears that it is not the relief of the defendant by any
orthodox equitable theory which constitutes the basis of the Court's deci-
sion, but rather an overriding policy to deter federal agents from uncon-
stitutional acts by undoing the effects of such acts. If this is so, that the
evidence was obtained initially by abuse of federal process or even that
the evidence was first suppressed in a federal prosecution would seem
immaterial. The Court's consideration of the federal rules as setting
judicially-enforceable "standards for law enforcement" to which federal
agents must adhere,2 in their conduct outside as well as within the federal
courts, appears to support this conclusion. Such an extension of the
McNabb doctrine for supervision of federal agents 28 suggests that, regard-
-less of how the Court may ultimately resolve the constitutional issue, the
Rea decision may presage an approach by the Court to the position taken
by Justice Holmes in his famous dictum: "The essence of a provision
forbidding the acquisition of evidence in a certain way is that not merely
evidence so acquired shall not be used before the Court but that it shall
not be used at all." 2 9
Labor Law-
GOOD FAITH INSISTENCE ON STRIKE-BALLOT
CLAUSE HELD PER SE VIOLATION OF SECTION
8(a) (5) OF TAFT-HARTLEY ACT
At the commencement of collective bargaining negotiations, the certified
union submitted contract proposals which included a "no-strike" clause.'
26. See Douglas v. City of Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 165 (1943).
27. Instant case at 217-18.
28. "Judicial supervision of the administration of criminal justice in the federal
courts implies the duty of establishing and maintaining civilized standards of procedure
and evidence. . . . Considerations of large policy in making the necessary accom-
modations in our federal system are wholly irrelevant to the formulation and appli-
cation ot proper standards for the enforcement of the federal criminal law in the
federal courts." McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 340-41 (1943). The Court
has refused to extend the McNabb doctrine to actions of state officers, Stein v. New
York, 346 U.S. 156, 186-88 (1953) ; Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 63-64 (1951).
29. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385, 392 (1920).
1. Under a "no-strike" clause, the union agrees not to call a strike (nor, generally,
a slowdown, sitdown, etc.) during the life of the contract. In return, the employer
generally agrees not to cause any lockout during this time. See MATHEWS, LABOR
RELATIONS AND THE LAW 411-13 (1953); Shell Oil Co., 77 N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948);
see also note 30 infra.
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Respondent company counter-proposed the adoption of a "strike-ballot"
clause. Under the latter clause the union could not call a strike unless
authorized by a majority vote of all voting employees of the bargaining
unit in an election to be held on company premises under impartial super-
vision.m2 Issues specifically subject to such a vote included the amendment,
modification or termination of the contract. If the company submitted a
new proposal within seventy-two hours after any strike authorization, a
new vote was required in order to strike thereafter. Although the union
representatives immediately rejected this proposal, the company continued
to include it in all subsequent negotiations. No agreement was reached
on this and other proposals, and after extended negotiations the union
called a strike. Thereafter, the union filed charges with the National Labor
Relations Board that the company had violated section 8(a) (5) of the
Taft-Hartley Act, which provides that an employer must "bargain collec-
tively" in "good faith" with his employees' representative.3 After a hearing
before a trial examiner, the NLRB held that, although the company had
acted in good faith, its "adamant insistence" upon the strike-ballot clause
constituted a per se violation of section 8(a) (5). The Board ruled that
this clause was not a proper subject of collective bargaining because it did
not come within the statutory subjects of "wages, hours, and other terms
and conditions of employment," and therefore the good faith of the em-
ployer was immaterial.4 Borg-Warner Corp., Wooster Division, 113
N.L.R.B. No. 120 (August 26, 1955).
The requirement of the Wagner Act 5 and the Taft-Hartley Act 6 that
an employer bargain in good faith with the employees' representative "with
2. It was also provided elsewhere in the proposed contract that certain disputes
which might arise during the life of the contract would be subject to arbitration and
thus would not be issues subject to the strike-ballot clause. Instant case at 2. (All
page references to the instant case refer to unreported mimeographed copy.)
3. 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (5) (1952); see 61 STAT. 142 (1947),
29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952). The complainant also charged that the company had
violated sections 8(a) (1) and 8(a) (3), 61 STAT. 141 (1947), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a) (1),
(3) (1952), by engaging in such activities as intimidating employees and interfering
with their union activities. Instant case at 10; see note 4 infra.
4. The Board also found a per se violation of section 8(a) (5) in the company's
position on recognition of the bargaining representative. Instant case at 7. The
international union had been certified by the NLRB as the bargaining agent for
the employees of the respondent company. Subsequently, a local union had been
organized by the international, and it proposed that both unions be recognized in
the contract. However, the company counter-proposed that only the local be recog-
nized, and not the already certified international. The only real question settled
by this finding was factual: that the company's position had passed suggestion and
had become insistence. It is well settled that an employer must bargain with the
union that is certified if the latter so requests. 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C.
§ 159(a) (1952), McQuay-Norris Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 116 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1940),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 565 (1941).
In addition, the NLRB found that the company had violated section 8(a) (1)
but rejected the trial examiner's finding of a violation of section 8(a) (3). Instant
case at 10.
5. 49 STAT. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C. § 158(5) (1940). Although not specifically
mentioning good faith, § 158(5) was uniformly construed to require bargaining in
good faith. E.g., Globe Cotton Mills v. NLRB, 103 F.2d 91, 94 (5th Cir. 1939).
6. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1952), provides: "For the purposes
of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation
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respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment"
has been the subject of much litigation before the Board and the courts.
Interpretation of this statutory language, which defines the scope of issues
upon which both parties must bargain, has been largely a process of ex-
pansion to include, for example, such issues as pensions, 7 merit increases,8
retirement programs, 9 Christmas bonuses,' 0 company dining hall policy,"1
union security, 12 health and accident insurance,' 3 and employee stock pur-
chase plans.' 4 While the Board has frequently indicated that certain sub-
jects may not be proper for bargaining, by citing insistence upon them as
one indicium of a desire not to bargain in good faith, 15 there have been only
a few situations where demanding a particular proposal has been held a per
se refusal to bargain. Thus, insisting that the contract be oral only,16 or
left unsigned 17 or be conditioned upon the union's making itself amenable
to suit by registering itself in accord with a state statute 1s have been held
per se refusals to bargain.' 9 In a situation more analogous to the instant
case, it was held in NLRB v. Corsicana Cotton Mills2° that a provision,
which would have subjected every act of the union as bargaining representa-
tive to a majority vote of all the employees of the unit, was not a proper
of the employer and the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times
and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and condi-
tions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising
thereunder, and the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement
reached if requested by either party, but such obligation does not compel either
party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. .. ."
7. Inland Steel Co. v. NLRB, 170 F.2d 247 (7th Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 336
U.S. 960 (1949).
8. NLRB v. 3. H. Allison & Co., 165 F.2d 766 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 335
U.S. 814 (1948).
9. Allied Mills, Inc., 82 N.L.R.B. 854 (1949).
10. Sullivan Dry Dock & Repair Co., 67 N.L.R.B. 627 (1946).
11. Weyerhaeuser Timber Co., 87 N.L.R.B. 672 (1949).
12. NLRB v. Andrew Jergens Co., 175 F2d 130 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 338
U.S. 827 (1949).
13. W. W. Cross & Co. v. NLRB, 174 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1949).
14. Richfield Oil Corp. v. NLRB, 231- F.2d 717 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
15. E.g., Standard Generator Service Co., 90 N.L.R.B. 790 (1950), enforcement
granted, 186 F.2d 606 (8th Cir. 1951) (insistence upon performance bond) ; NLRB v.
George Pilling & Son Co., 119 F.2d 32 (3d Cir. 1941) (insistence that union organize
employer's competitors) ; NLRB v. Reed & Prince Mfg. Co., 118 F.2d 874 (1st Cir.),
cert. denied, 313 U.S. 595 (1941) (insistence that union never request certain pro-
visions in future) ; Franklin Hosiery Mills, Inc., 83 N.L.R.B. 276 (1949) (insistence
upon unilateral control over wage reductions).
16. H. J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
17. NLRB v. Todd Co., 173 F.2d 705 (1949).
18. NLRB v. Dalton Telephone Co., 187 F.2d 811 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 824 (1951).
19. See also Gay Paree Undergarment Co., 91 N.L.R.B. 1363 (1950) (insistence
upon contractual right to discharge strikers "whether for union activity or not").
It is clear that insistence upon terms which are made unlawful by the act violates
section 8(a) (5). E.g., National Maritime Union, 78 N.L.R.B. 971 (1948), enforce-
ment granted, 175 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1949), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 954 (1950) (in-
sistence upon clause providing for discriminatory hiring hall).
20. 178 F.2d 344 (5th Cir. 1949).
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subject of collective bargaining. In what appears to be the only previous
decision involving a strike-ballot clause, the Seventh Circuit, reversing the
Board,21 held in Allis-Chalmers v. NLRB 22 that such a clause was included
within the "subjects of bargaining" language of the statute; therefore, the
employer was within his rights in insisting in good faith upon its inclusion
in the contract. Although the Board in the instant case viewed Allis-
Chalmers as directly on point, it refused to follow the Seventh Circuit
holding.
23
An evaluation of the ruling of the Board in the instant case that the
strike ballot clause is not a proper subject of collective bargaining presents
a difficult problem because, superficially at least, the clause appears to have
some merit. However, a closer analysis of the natural tendencies of such
provision reveals a basic inconsistency between that provision and the policy
of the labor acts, which is that representative bargaining is essential to
effectuate employee interests. The provision in the instant case requiring,
prior to a strike, a vote on the company's last or any succeeding offer
presents at least a theoretical possibility of completely nullifying the repre-
sentative's primary bargaining weapon, the strike, by a succession o
offers.2 4 Even without this "successive offer" feature, the strike-ballot is
objectionable as undermining the union's status as the employee repre-
sentative. The union, if it is to exist, must justify itself before its members,,
and it can do this only by pointing to its accomplishments as a whole. If
the union does not have authority to act at the time it deems strategic, and,
if its responsibility for determining what stand should be taken on each
individual issue in light of over-all objectives must depend upon the direc-
tion of the employees, most of whom will view the question only in light
of what they conceive to be their immediate self interest, then the union
leaders' judgment and experience are largely lost. Thus the union will
weakened and tend to become discredited in the eyes of its members. A
purportedly representative system wherein the representative is without
independent authority and responsibility is not a representative system.
Those who are represented have the right merely to determine the limits
of the representative's authority and responsibility. Moreover, whatever
restrictions are placed upon the representative, their determination is prop-
erly the decision of the represented and not of the representative's antagonist.
The argument which appears to have swayed the Seventh Circuit in Allis-1
Chalmers was that non-union employees should be given a voice in the
decisions of the union for otherwise they are "cast into oblivion." 25 One
21. 106 N.L.R.B. 939 (1953).
22. 213 F.2d 374 (7th Cir. 1954).
23. Instant case at 8.
24. While this possibility may be tempered by the probability that, unless each
new offer by the company more nearly approached the union demands, the obvious
misuse of the provision would constitute a bad faith refusal to bargain, even a finite
succession of offers would tend to be a "wearing down" tactic, in addition to encourag-
ing the company to be less compromising in negotiation.
25. 213 F.2d at 381.
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answer is that if the non-union employees want this "voice" they can join
the union. Admittedly this is not a satisfactory answer in every case; but if
the price of effective unionism, which is favored by a majority of the em-
ployees, is that some individuals will be dissatisfied, that price does not seem
too high to pay. By analogy, it may be observed that in the political area
this is an accepted element of democratic government. The most weighty
argument to justify strike-ballot provisions suggests that the procedure set
forth will eliminate or prevent undemocratic practices in the government of
labor unions under which the will of the majority is overrun.2 It is said
that, even where the union voluntarily polls its members prior to striking,
forged ballots, mob domination, and other activity have cast doubt upon the
results of such voting. But even if such practices do exist, it does not jus-
tify the exaction of "reform" at the behest of the employer without com-
plaint by union members. If, indeed, there is a public interest in controlling
such activity, then the question would seem one for legislative action, not
employer imposition.27 A final argument for the strike-ballot, advanced
in the instant case,28 is that the certified union may not in fact represent
the majority of the employees. This is a real consideration in the situation
where there is a great expansion of the bargaining unit subsequent to cer-
tification and most of the new employees are non-union or favor a compet-
ing union. Here the employer may have a legitimate interest in seeing that
production is not impaired by a strike called by a union which has no real
responsibility to the employees as a whole and is supported only by a rela-
tively small percentage of them. However, since the union's certification
can be attacked after the first year,2 the problem is only temporary and
could, it would seem, be solved by insisting upon a no-strike clause effective
during the term of the contract,30 rather than the strike-ballot provision.
Labor Law-
WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION BENEFITS FOR INJURIES
SUSTAINED AT TIME OF DISCRIMINATORY FIRING
HELD DEDUCTIBLE FROM BACK-PAY AWARD
In an unfair labor practice proceeding under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act,1 the NLRB ordered that two employees, who had been dis-
26. See id. at 379.
27. With regard to legislative proposals to regulate striking, see PARN S, UNION
STRIKE: VOTES (1956), a comprehensive analysis of the many arguments for and
against such legislation. The work includes detailed consideration of present union
practices.
28. Instant case at 7.
29. 61 STAT. 142 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1952).
30. Such a clause has been specifically held a proper subject of bargaining upon
which an employer may condition the signing of an agreement. Shell Oil Co., 77
N.L.R.B. 1306 (1948).
1. The National Labor Relations Act § 10(c), 49 STAT. 454 (1935), as amended,
29 U.S.C. § 160(c) (1952), provides that the NLRB, on a finding of an unfair labor
practice by an employer, has the power to take such affirmative action, including
reinstatement with or without back pay, as will effectuate the policies of the act.
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criminatorily discharged, be reinstated with full back pay.2 In a subse-
quent proceeding to determine the amount of the back-pay award, the
NLRB concluded that the workmen's compensation payments, which one
of the employees had received for injuries sustained at the hands of an
officer of the defendant company at the time of the unlawful discharge,
were not deductible from the award.3 The Board relied on NLRB v.
Giellett Gin Co.,4 in which the Supreme Court upheld a Board ruling
denying an employer the right to deduct state unemployment compensation
payments paid to the employee during the period of unemployment follow-
ing his discriminatory discharge in computing the amount owed to the
employee ordered reinstated with full back pay. The Supreme Court
reasoned that since unemployment benefits were paid by the state they
were collateral benefits and, therefore, the employer could not take ad-
vantage of them to reduce his liability.5 In reversing the Board in the
instant case, the Fourth Circuit distinguished the Gullett case by holding
that workmen's compensation benefits, which are paid by the employer
through his "agent," the insurance company, are "direct" rather than
"collateral" payments, and, therefore, are deductible from the award.
NLRB v. Moss Planing Mill Co., 224 F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1955).
The instant court's distinction between unemployment compensation
payments, paid by the state, and workmen's compensation payments, paid
by the private insurer, does not justify not following the Gudlett case.
While payment in the former instance is from a state fund derived from
taxation and in the latter from a fund derived from insurance premiums,
the significance of this distinction is minimized by the similarities of the
two programs. Both are set up by state statute 1 in order to replace in part
an employee's lost wages.7  Both programs create the funds from which
benefits are paid by employer contributions," determined as a percentage
of the employer's payroll.9 The ultimate cost of both programs is borne
2. Moss Planing Mill Co., 103 N.L.R.B. 414, enforcement granted, 206 F.2d 557
(4th Cir. 1953).
3. Moss Planing Mill Co., 110 N.L.R.B. 933 (1954).
4. 340 U.S. 361 (1951); see also Marshall Field & Co. v. NLRB, 318 U.S. 253
(1943).
5. 340 U.S. at 364-65.
6. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. c. 96 (1950) (unemployment compensation);
id. c. 97 (workmen's compensation) ; see also 1 LARSON, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION
§ 5.30 (1952); Rothman, Foreword to a Symposium on Unemployment Insurance,
8 VAND. L. REv. 179 (1955).
7. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAr. § 96-2 (1950) (unemployment compensation);
Campbell, Basic Principles of Workmen's Compensation, 20 Miss. L.J. 117, 123
(1949) ; Larson, The Nature and Origins of Workmen's Compensation, 37 CORNELL
L.Q. 206, 209, 220 (1952); Mitchell, Workers' Insurance in the United States, 4
NAT'L B.J. 345, 347 (1946) (unemployment compensation); Wandel, Introduction
to a Symposium on Unemployment Compensation, 10 OHIO ST. L.J. 121 (1949).
8. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 96-9 (Supp. 1955) (unemployment compensa-
tion); id. §§ 97-9, 97-21, 97-93 (1950) (workmen's compensation); Campbell, supra
note 7, at 119, 124; Larson, supra note 7, at 207; Riesenfeld, The Place of Unemploy-
ment Insurance Within the Patterns and Policies of Protection Against Wage-Loss,
8 VAND. L. REv. 218, 241 (1955) ; Wandel, supra note 7, at 126.
9. SoMRs & SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION 103, 117-18 (1954); Rothman,
supra note 6, at 179.
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in great part by the consumer. 10 The payments to the employee under
both programs are made according to a statutory scheme which provides
the conditions and amounts of the payments." The instant court did not
discuss any of these similarities. Instead, it called the private insurer in
the workmen's compensation situation an "agent," suggesting a control
by the employer over the fund created and over the insurer's conduct which
does not in fact exist and which, in any event, is no greater than the control
of an employer over a state depository. Therefore, to call the payment in
one instance "collateral" and in the other "direct" is to make a verbal,
rather than a factual, distinction.' 2
This similarity appears so marked that the instant decision might be
interpreted as an attempt to circumvent, or at least to limit, the holding in
the Gullett case. If this is true then it is appropriate to reconsider the
problem of deduction of compensation payments for loss of wages from
NLRB back-pay awards, regardless of whether such payments were re-
ceived as unemployment compensation or workmen's compensation.' 3 Two
NLRB practices which are followed in computing back-pay awards seem
to conflict when applied to this problem. On the one hand, since the NLRB
does not consider collateral losses sustained by an employee during the
period following his discriminatory discharge, 14 logic and fairness would
seem to require that the same procedure be followed in the case of col-
lateral gains. Such a theory has been followed in cases involving a tort
recovery by an employee against his employer,15 a situation analogous to
the problem under discussion. But this reasoning is applicable only if
compensation payments are justifiably called collateral.' Because the risk
experience of an employer partially determines the size of his future pre-
10. 1 LARSON, op. cit. supra note 6, § 1.00; Campbell, supra note 7, at 120; Larson,
supra note 7, at 206, 215; Mitchell, supra note 7, at 350.
11. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 96-12 to 96-18 (1950) (unemployment com-
pensation); id. §§ 97-17, 97-18, 97-28 (1950), 97-25, 97-29 to 97-31 (Supp. 1955)
(workmen's compensation) ; Larson, supra note 7, at 220.
12. There are, of course, differences between the two programs, probably the
most striking of which is that workmen's compensation is granted in lieu of an
employer's tort liability to his employees. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-10 (1950).
For a discussion of the distinctions between tort liability and workmen's compen-
sation, see Larson, supra note 7, at 208-15.
13. In the instant case, allowing the deduction of that part of the workmen's
compensation award paid to compensate the employee for his medical expenses, rather
than loss of wages, see 2 LARSON, WORKMEN'S CoMPENS.T oN §§ 57.10, 61.00 (1952),
would leave him less than whole and, of course, should not be allowed. The remainder
of the workmen's compensation payments are similar to unemployment compensation
payments, see note 7 supra, and should be treated similarly.
14. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951) (dictum).
15. See Overland Constr. Co. v. Sydnor, 70 F.2d 338, 340 (6th Cir. 1934) ; Hetrick
v. Reading Co., 39 F. Supp. 22, 24-25 (D.N.J. 1941); McCarthy v. Palmer, 29 F.
Supp. 585, 588-89 (E.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 113 F.2d 721, 723 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
311 U.S. 680 (1940); 4 RESTATFmENT, TORTS § 924, comment c (1939).
16. This was the analysis followed by the Supreme Court in NLRB v. Gullett
Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 364 (1951); cf. NLRB v. Marshall Field & Co., 129 F.2d 169,
172-73 (7th Cir. 1942), aff'd, 318 U.S. 253 (1943); Bang v. International Sisal Co.,
212 Minn. 135, 141, 4 N.W.2d 113, 116 (1942).
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mium payments,' 7 he can argue that he is paying at least part of the com-
pensation payment, albeit indirectly. To that extent they should not be
deemed collateral. While superficially plausible, such an argument over-
looks the difficulty of ascertaining what, if any, impact any one claim has
upon future premium payments and the probability that any significant
reimbursement of the insurer for this one claim from some fractional part
of the premium would take many years. Furthermore, any premium
increase reflects a determination by the insurer, based upon past experience
of the insured, that the risk of loss in the future has increased, and thus
the higher premiums are not properly reimbursement for past expenses
but rather additional cost of future protection.
The second NLRB practice dealing with computation of back-pay
awards sets up a conflict with the first. It has been NLRB practice,' 8 ap-
proved by the Supreme Court,19 to deduct the amount of net earnings which
an employee earned, or should have earned, during the period following
his discriminatory discharge. Since compensation payments are similar to,
and substitutes for, earnings they might be treated in a like manner.
2 0
This analogy is buttressed by the argument that to do otherwise makes the
employee more than whole at the expense of his employer.2 ' This result
would appear to conflict with the Supreme Court requirement that back-
17. The rate of contribution to the unemployment compensation fund is a set
percentage of the employer's annual payroll unless he can qualify for a reduced rate
under his experience-rating record. See, e.g., LA. REv. STAT. §23:1534 (1950),
§§23:1535-36 (Supp. 1955). If all of an employer's contributions to the fund less
all the benefits paid to his former employees bears a certain relationship to the em-
ployer's average annual payroll, he can get a reduced rate. See, e.g., id. § 23:1536.
There is, therefore, a direct relation between an employer's contribution rate and the
amount of compensation paid to his former employees. Similar results in the case of
workmen's compensation are produced by use of a merit-rating formula. See Somans
& So mns, op. cit. supra note 9, at 106-09.
18. Note, Back Pay Orders Under the National Labor Relations Act, 48 YALE
L.J. 1265, 1271-72 (1939); see also 11 NLRB ANzN. REP. 50 (1946).
19. Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 197-98 (1941); Republic Steel
Corp. v. NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 9 (1940).
20. This practice of deducting amounts which an employee should have earned
might be analyzed as an effectuation of a public policy which seeks to encourage all
able-bodied men to seek work. By deducting these amounts a worker who does not
secure available employment is penalized and thus encouraged to seek new employ-
ment even though discriminatorily fired. The Gullett rule may work contrary to
this policy. Since by not working an employee receives compensation payments plus
full back pay, while if he found work he could never receive an amount greater than
full back pay, he is encouraged not to seek employment on his own. However, the
danger that the worker will utilize Gullett in such a manner is mitigated by the
fact that compensation payments may not be adequate to support the employee and
his family and that in many cases he cannot be reasonably sure of winning back pay
in a NLRB proceeding. Therefore, there is a strong incentive to secure employment.
But at the least, the deduction of compensation payments from a back-pay award re-
moves one incentive for an employee not to seek work. While it does not penalize
the employee if he fails to secure employment, it also does not "reward" him for
such failure.
This analysis is primarily applicable to unemployment compensation payments.
Workmen's compensation payments are made to an incapacitated worker; therefore,
there is no public policy of encouraging one unable to work to seek employment.
21. This occurs since the employer pays both the back-pay award and the com-
pensation. See note 17 supra. This was the concern of the court in the instant
case. Instant case at 704.
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pay awards be remedial rather than punitive.22  However, this may not
be so. First, the employee may have suffered losses, other than loss of
wages, as a result of the discriminatory firing23 which would prevent the
award of full back pay from being a windfall. Second, if it is felt that the
employee has been made more than whole an action might lie on the part
of the insurer or state fund to recover back the compensation payments.
24
This would have a twofold effect: the employee's "windfall" would be
recovered and the rate that the employer must pay would remain un-
changed. Third, the NLRB may have determined that the purposes of the
act require that the employer pay a full back-pay award in order to give it
the proper deterrent effect.2 5
It is difficult to place compensation payments closer to either non-
deductible receipts such as gifts or deductible ones such as earnings. The
foregoing analysis leads to the conclusion that, while either result can be
supported by persuasive authority, the better rule would appear to be to
deduct the compensation payments from the back-pay award until Congress
expressly authorizes the NLRB to act in more than a remedial fashion
to effectuate the purposes of the National Labor Relations Act. But until
reversed or rendered nugatory by congressional legislation, NLRB v.
Gullett Gin Co. is the controlling case in the area and should have governed
the disposition of the instant case.
22. NLRB v. Gullett Gin Co., 340 U.S. 361, 362 (1951); Republic Steel Corp. v.
NLRB, 311 U.S. 7, 10, 12 (1940).
23. E.g., forced borrowing, evictions, mortgage foreclosures, forfeiture of rights
under installment contracts and insurance policies, and impairment of physical and
mental health.
24. Such a procedure was upheld by a New York court in the case of unemploy-
ment compensation, on the theory that, since the employee was awarded full back
pay, in retrospect he was never unemployed within the meaning of the applicable
statute, and therefore, did not qualify for the benefits he had received. In the matter
of Skutnik, 268 App. Div. 357, 51 N.Y.S.2d 711 (3d Dep't 1944).
25. See Waterman S.S. Corp. v. NLRB, 119 F.2d 760, 763 (5th Cir. 1941).
